Can verifiable information cut through the noise about climate protection? An experimental auction test

被引:0
|
作者
Onur Sapci
Aaron D. Wood
Jason F. Shogren
Jolene F. Green
机构
[1] Hamilton College,Economics Department
[2] University of Tampa,Economics Department
[3] University of Wyoming,Department of Economics and Finance
来源
Climatic Change | 2016年 / 134卷
关键词
Information Treatment; Auction Mechanism; Climate Protection; Bidding Behavior; Recycle Paper;
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中图分类号
学科分类号
摘要
Using an experimental auction, we explore how verifiable information affects the willingness to pay (WTP) for two climate friendly goods given the politicized climate change debate. We test whether the dissemination of (scientific) verifiable information lets subjects cut through the media noise. We define our baseline by first examining how noisy information (pro and con) about climate change affects WTP. We then consider how third party verifiable information within this noisy information affects WTP. Our results suggest subjects could cut through noisy information to process verifiable information. We find a significant WTP premium for climate protection. The verifiable information treatment increases the premium for both shade-grown coffee (by 51 %) and recycled paper (by 48 %). This suggests the WTP premium for climate change depends on the available information flow and the characteristics of the climate friendly good.
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页码:87 / 99
页数:12
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