Federal Open Market Committee;
FOMC;
Federal Reserve;
Federal Reserve transparency;
Federal Reserve bureaucratic objectives;
E58;
D O I:
暂无
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摘要:
The calculus of electoral politics and the central bank’s bureaucratic objectives can explain the recent trend toward greater Federal Reserve transparency and can shed light on the likelihood that this trend will continue. If incumbent politicians see no electoral advantage in pressuring the Fed to become still more transparent, and if the Fed sees no benefit to greater transparancy, then further changes in current practice are unlikely. Private sector agents will continue to face a significant degree of uncertainty about the Fed’s policy objectives and about the information that policymakers consider in the monetary policy decision process.
机构:
St Pauls Hosp, Dept Med Imaging, 1081 Burrard St, Vancouver, BC V6S 1Y6, CanadaSt Pauls Hosp, Dept Med Imaging, 1081 Burrard St, Vancouver, BC V6S 1Y6, Canada
Leipsic, Jonathon
Chandrashekhar, Y.
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机构:
Univ Minnesota, Div Cardiol, 1 Vet Dr, Minneapolis, MN 55417 USASt Pauls Hosp, Dept Med Imaging, 1081 Burrard St, Vancouver, BC V6S 1Y6, Canada
机构:
Washington Univ, Sch Med, Lauren V Ackerman Lab Surg Pathol, St Louis, MO 63110 USAWashington Univ, Sch Med, Lauren V Ackerman Lab Surg Pathol, St Louis, MO 63110 USA