Public-Private Partnership Contractual Design: A Computational Model of the Moral Hazard with Lotteries

Public-Private Partnership (PPP) is a new model of public management which consists of the contractual relationship between public and private entities. In particular, PPPs enable risk share between public and private sectors making the asymmetric information problem in a contractual arrangement more evident. The aim of this paper was to study a moral hazard problem applied to PPP contracts. To achieve this objective, a PPP computational contractual model including the moral hazard with lotteries was developed to assess how contractual changes could affect the optimum behavior of arrangement members. Simulations indicate that projects with higher economic value should attract more qualified firms, which may be why the companies expend more effort. To deal with possible contractual contingencies and try to minimize the moral hazard problem, the government could draw up more flexible contracts in order to include possible necessary changes and punish unwanted or improper consortium behavior. © 2016, Springer Science+Business Media New York.