Non-Controlling Minority Shareholdings and Collusion

被引:0
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作者
Samuel de Haas
Johannes Paha
机构
[1] Justus-Liebig-University,Chair for Industrial Organization, Regulation and Antitrust
[2] Stellenbosch University,undefined
[3] Potsdam University,undefined
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关键词
Collusion; Common ownership; Cross ownership; Minority shareholdings;
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摘要
This article merges theoretical literature on non-controlling minority shareholdings (NCMS) in a coherent model to study the effects of NCMS on competition and collusion. The model encompasses both the case of a common owner holding shares of rival firms as well as the case of cross ownership among rivals. We find that by softening competition, NCMS weaken the sustainability of collusion under a greater variety of situations than was indicated by earlier literature. Such effects exist, in particular, in the presence of an effective competition authority.
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页码:431 / 454
页数:23
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