On optimality of illegal collusion in contracts

被引：4

作者：

Lambert-Mogiliansky A. ^{[1
,2
]}

机构：

[1] CERAS-ENPC - Ecole Nationale des Ponts et Chaussées, F-75343 Paris

[2] THEMA, Paris X

来源：

Review of Economic Design | 1998年 / 3卷 / 4期

关键词：

Collusion; Commitment; Renegotiation; Transaction costs;

D O I：

10.1007/s100580050018

中图分类号：

学科分类号：

摘要：

Illegal collusion is a widespread phenomenon all around the world. Yet, models of hierarchical agency relationships tend not to predict collusion. This paper demonstrates that a natural requirement of interim efficiency suffices for collusion to appear in equilibrium in a simple standard setting. The optimal extent of collusion depends on the efficacy of the legal system. When the transaction costs associated with illegal deals are small enough, inducing some illegal collusion between the agent and his supervisor increases the principal's payoff. © Springer-Verlag 1998.

引用

页码：303 / 328

页数：25

共 24 条

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