Optimal Abatement and Emission Permit Trading Policies in a Dynamic Transboundary Pollution Game

被引：1
|
作者：
Shuhua Chang
Suresh P. Sethi
Xinyu Wang
机构：
[1] Tianjin University of Finance and Economics,Coordinated Innovation Center for Computable Modeling in Management Science
[2] The University of Texas at Dallas,Naveen Jindal School of Management
来源：
Dynamic Games and Applications | 2018年 / 8卷
关键词：
Transboundary pollution; Differential game; Pollution abatement strategies; Emission permits trading; Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman equation;
D O I：
暂无
中图分类号：
学科分类号：
摘要：
We obtain optimal emission levels and abatement expenditures in a finite-horizon transboundary pollution game with emission trading between two regions. We show that emission trading has significant impact on the optimal strategies and profits of the two regions. We find that cooperation between the regions leads to increased abatement and lower emissions, resulting in a lower pollution stock. We also provide a stochastic extension in which the pollution stock and the emission trading price are diffusion processes and solve it numerically.
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页码：542 / 572
页数：30
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