Phenomenal Continuity and the Bridge Problem

被引:0
|
作者
Johan E. Gustafsson
机构
[1] Royal Institute of Technology,Division of Philosophy
来源
Philosophia | 2011年 / 39卷
关键词
Phenomenal continuity; Temporal gaps; The bridge problem; Personal identity; Barry Dainton; Psychological continuity;
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摘要
Any theory that analyses personal identity in terms of phenomenal continuity needs to deal with the ordinary interruptions of our consciousness that it is commonly thought that a person can survive. This is the bridge problem. The present paper offers a novel solution to the bridge problem based on the proposal that dreamless sleep need not interrupt phenomenal continuity. On this solution one can both hold that phenomenal continuity is necessary for personal identity and that persons can survive dreamless sleep.
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页码:289 / 296
页数:7
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