Semantic and Structural Problems in Evolutionary Ethics

In ''A Defense of Evolutionary Ethics'' (1986), Robert J. Richardsendeavors to explain how moral 'oughts' can be derived from thescience of evolutionary biology without committing the dreadednaturalistic fallacy. First, Richards assumes that 'ought' as usedin ethical discourse bears the same meaning as 'ought' used anywherein science, indicating merely that certain results or behaviors arepredicted based on prior structured contexts. To this extent, themoral behavior of animals, what they 'ought' to do, could arguablybe predicted by evolutionary biology as effectively as, say,molecular behavior may be predicted by chemistry. But afteracknowledging that biological inferences to this limited senseof 'ought' were never contested by Moore's naturalistic fallacy,Richard proposes to add to evolutionary ethics a decision procedureto determine which members of a set of predicted behaviors arethose which truly ought to occur – in the genuinelyprescriptive sense intended by ethical discourse. But theprocedure which Richards fabricates for this purpose appealsto such alleged 'facts' as cultural conventions and moral opinionpolling, hardly a secure foundation for the sort of scientific ethics promised by Richards at the outset.