Who bribes in public contracting and why: worldwide evidence from firms

被引:0
|
作者
Anna D’Souza
Daniel Kaufmann
机构
[1] Economic Research Service,
[2] Revenue Watch,undefined
来源
Economics of Governance | 2013年 / 14卷
关键词
Governance; Corruption; Bribery; Public contracting; Public procurement; K42; L1; H11; P48;
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摘要
We study procurement bribery utilizing survey data from 11,000 enterprises in 125 countries. About one-third of managers report that firms like theirs bribe to secure a public contract, paying about 8 % of the contract value. Econometric estimations suggest that national governance factors, such as democratic accountability, press freedom, and rule of law, are associated with lower bribery. Larger and foreign-owned firms are less likely to bribe than smaller domestic ones. But among bribers, foreign and domestic firms pay similar amounts. Multinational firms appear sensitive to reputational risks in their home countries, but partially adapt to their host country environments.
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页码:333 / 367
页数:34
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