Strategic Interactions in a One-Sector Growth Model

被引：0
|
作者：
Eric Fesselmeyer
Leonard J. Mirman
Marc Santugini
机构：
[1] National University of Singapore,Department of Economics
[2] University of Virginia,Department of Economics
[3] HEC Montréal,Department of Applied Economics and CIRPEE
来源：
Dynamic Games and Applications | 2016年 / 6卷
关键词：
Capital accumulation; Dynamic game; Growth; Investment; Technical progress;
D O I：
暂无
中图分类号：
学科分类号：
摘要：
We study the effect of dynamic and investment externalities in a one-sector growth model. In our model, two agents interact strategically in the utilization of capital for consumption, savings, and investment in technical progress. We consider two types of investment choices: complements and substitutes. For each case, we derive the equilibrium and provide the corresponding stationary distribution. We then compare the equilibrium with the social planner’s solution.
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页码：209 / 224
页数：15
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