Indeterminism, explanation, and luck

I first adumbrate pertinent aspects of Robert Kane's libertarian theory of free choice or action and an objection of luck that has been levelled against the theory. I then consider Kane's recent responses to this objection. To meet these responses, I argue that the view that undetermined choices (of the sort implied by Kane's theory) are a matter of luck is associated with a view about action explanation, to wit: when Jones does A and his doing of A is undetermined, and when his counterpart, Jones*, in the nearest possible world in which the past and the laws are held constant until the moment of choice does B instead, there is no explanation (deterministic or indeterministic) of the difference in outcome - Jones's A-ing but Jones*'s B-ing - in terms of prior reasons or motives of either agent. Absence of such an explanation is one crucial factor that underlies the charge that Jones's A-ing and Jones*'s B-ing are matters of luck. I argue that this sort of luck is incompatible with responsibility. © 2000 Kluwer Academic Publishers.