A Law of Large Numbers: Bidding and Compulsory Competitive Tendering for Refuse Collection Contracts

被引：0

作者：

AndréS GóMez-Lobo

Stefan Szymanski

机构：

[1] University of Chile,Department of Economics

[2] Imperial College Management School,undefined

来源：

Review of Industrial Organization | 2001年 / 18卷

关键词：

Econometrics of auctions; refuse collection; tendering;

D O I：

暂无

中图分类号：

学科分类号：

摘要：

In this paper we investigate the relationship betweencosts and number of bidders for U.K. local authorities'refuse collection contracts. We find that a highernumber of bids is associated with a lower cost ofservice. This finding, as well as being an importantempirical verification of standard proposition inauction theory, has important policy implications. TheU.K. Labour government elected in 1997 has abolishedCompulsory Competitive Tendering (CCT). Our findingsindicate that this would increase local authorities'expenditure in refuse collection.

引用

页码：105 / 113

页数：8