On the geometry of Nash equilibria and correlated equilibria

被引：0
|
作者：
Robert Nau
Sabrina Gomez Canovas
Pierre Hansen
机构：
[1] Duke University,Fuqua School of Business
[2] École des Hautes Etudes Commerciales and École Polytechnique de Montréal,Group for Research in Decision Analysis (GERAD)
来源：
International Journal of Game Theory | 2004年 / 32卷
关键词：
 C720;
D O I：
暂无
中图分类号：
学科分类号：
摘要：
It is well known that the set of correlated equilibrium distributions of an n-player noncooperative game is a convex polytope that includes all the Nash equilibrium distributions. We demonstrate an elementary yet surprising result: the Nash equilibria all lie on the boundary of the polytope.
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页码：443 / 453
页数：10
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