Moral Theorizing and the Source of Normativity in Classical Chinese Philosophy: An Outline

被引:0
|
作者
Philippe Brunozzi
机构
[1] Southeast University,Department of Philosophy, School of Humanities
[2] Universität Kassel,Institut für Philosophie
来源
Dao | 2020年 / 19卷
关键词
Moral theorizing; Normativity; Moral reasons; Mengzi 孟子; C; Yi 程頤;
D O I
暂无
中图分类号
学科分类号
摘要
When engaging with classical Chinese ethics, we might end up wondering what kind of moral theorizing we ultimately are confronted with. The accounts and answers to specific practical problems are dispersed throughout the texts and expressed via various codes of composition, ranging from sayings to theoretical reflections to poems. However, what exactly the aim of these theories consists in is not explicitly addressed by systematic second-order reflections. In this article I try to shed some light on the understanding of moral theorizing that underlies the transmitted texts. For this, I adopt an issue-centered approach that attempts to indirectly address the understanding of moral theorizing via the question about the source of normativity. That approach will be tested by drawing on the accounts of Mengzi 孟子 and Cheng Yi 程頤. First conclusions will show that moral theorizing can be understood as the simultaneous business of a moral anatomist and a moral painter.
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页码:335 / 351
页数:16
相关论文
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