Intelligence without representation – Merleau-Ponty's critique of mental representation The relevance of phenomenology to scientific explanation

被引:345
作者
Hubert L. Dreyfus
机构
[1] University of California at Berkeley,Department of Philosophy
关键词
Mental Representation; Successful Learning; Maximal Grip; Skillful Action; Tight Connection;
D O I
10.1023/A:1021351606209
中图分类号
学科分类号
摘要
Existential phenomenologists hold that the two most basic forms of intelligent behavior, learning, and skillful action, can be described and explained without recourse to mind or brain representations. This claim is expressed in two central notions in Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of Perception: the intentional arc and the tendency to achieve a maximal grip. The intentional arc names the tight connection between body and world, such that, as the active body acquires skills, those skills are “stored”, not as representations in the mind, but as dispositions to respond to the solicitations of situations in the world. A phenomenology of skill acquisition confirms that, as one acquires expertise, the acquired know-how is experienced as finer and finer discriminations of situations paired with the appropriate response to each. Maximal grip names the body's tendency to refine its responses so as to bring the current situation closer to an optimal gestalt. Thus, successful learning and action do not require propositional mental representations. They do not require semantically interpretable brain representations either.
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页码:367 / 383
页数:16
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[1]  
Freeman W. J.(1991)The physiology of perception Scientific American 264 78-85