Ex-Post Evaluation of Competition Law Enforcement Effects in the German Packaging Waste Compliance Scheme Market

被引:0
|
作者
Arno Rasek
Florian Smuda
机构
[1] Bundeskartellamt (German Federal Cartel Office),
来源
De Economist | 2018年 / 166卷
关键词
Ex post evaluation; Competition law enforcement; Compliance scheme; Packaging waste; Non-profit company; De-monopolization; Consumer welfare effects; D4; L4; L43; L9;
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摘要
We provide an ex-post evaluation of the impact of competition law enforcement activities in the German packaging waste compliance scheme market. Until 2003, the non-profit compliance scheme DSD enjoyed a monopoly in the market. Numerous antitrust cases, however, paved the way for competitive market structures. We show that these enforcement activities resulted in a series of market entries since 2004, a corresponding drop in DSD’s market share, increased innovation and substantial efficiencies. Furthermore, we apply a difference-in-differences approach to show that prices decreased by 63% and to estimate the aggregated consumer welfare gains achieved by 2011 at a total of €13 billion. In the given case imposing a non-profit obligation on the monopolist did not substitute for the efficiency-enhancing effects of competition.
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页码:89 / 109
页数:20
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