Equilibrium customer behavior in the M/M/1 retrial queue with working vacations and a constant retrial rate

被引：0
|
作者：
Nam H. Do
Tien Van Do
Agassi Melikov
机构：
[1] Budapest University of Technology and Economics,Analysis, Design and Development of ICT systems (AddICT) Laboratory, Department of Networked Systems and Services
[2] Ton Duc Thang University,Division of Knowledge and System Engineering for ICT, Faculty of Information Technology
[3] Institute of Cybernetics National Academy of Sciences of Azerbaijan,undefined
来源：
Operational Research | 2020年 / 20卷
关键词：
Retrial queue; Vacations; Strategic behavior;
D O I：
暂无
中图分类号：
学科分类号：
摘要：
In this paper, we investigate the M/M/1 retrial queue with working vacations and a constant retrial rate. In the queue, customers decide about the entry based on the information upon their arrival instants. Scenarios regarding the availability of information (i.e., the server is occupied or not, and the server is on the vacation or not) for customers are compared. We derive the closed form solution for the stationary probabilities of the queue. Social optimizing and Nash equilibrium strategies for joining the system are investigated. Based on numerical results, the social benefit rate is best when customers know all information about the server.
引用
收藏
页码：627 / 646
页数：19
相关论文
共 50 条
12345