Rubinstein bargaining with two-sided outside options

被引：39

作者：

Ponsati, C

Sakovics, J ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Autonoma Barcelona, CSIC, Inst Anal Econ, E-08193 Barcelona, Spain

[2] Univ Autonoma Barcelona, CODE, E-08193 Barcelona, Spain

[3] Univ Autonoma Barcelona, Dept Econ & Hist Econ, E-08193 Barcelona, Spain

[4] Univ Autonoma Barcelona, CSIC, Inst Anal Econ, E-08193 Barcelona, Spain

来源：

ECONOMIC THEORY | 1998年 / 11卷 / 03期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1007/s001990050208

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

In this note we show that if in the standard Rubinstein model both players are allowed to leave the negotiation after a rejection, in which case they obtain a payoff of zero, then there exist a continuum of subgame-perfect equilibrium outcomes, including some which involve significant delay. We also fully characterize the case in which, upon quitting, the players can take an outside option of positive value.

引用

页码：667 / 672

页数：6

共 9 条

[1] MONEY BURNING AND MULTIPLE EQUILIBRIA IN BARGAINING [J].