An Inquiry into Impacts about Periods and Precision of Noises in Career-Concerns Incentive

Periods of career cycle and output noises influence a principal, an agent and total surplus in career-Concerns Incentive. First, in the T-period career cycle, the agent's effort is the most in early stages and is descending with the timing of moves; in the end his effort is zero. Second, there are more the agents' effort and output if there are more periods in the career cycle, and it exists the optimal periods for the most efficiency. Third, the principal's payoff is increasing with the agent's effort increase in t period, which is better off in early stages but worse off in later stages; the agent's expected payoff and total surplus show the different changing characters with the timing of moves under the different conditions. Fourth, if precision increases, the agent's effort and the principal's expected payoff increases; But the agent's expected payoff and total surplus take on the different changing characters with precision changes on the different conditions. In the end the career-concerns model is compared with formal contracts and relational contracts.