On the Active Subject: An Essay in the Philosophy of Perception

Author analyses quite common and popular philosophical thesis that cognitive subject is active in the process of cognition. Author draws a distinction between different senses of the thesis and tries to analyze their implications. In particular, he tries to show that cognitivistic theories of perception do not support general philosophical antirealism. He tries to show that, contrary to this thesis, general philosophical realism is a much better general framework for understanding cognitivistic theories of perception. Author tries to show that: 1) Cognition is not and it should not be a projection but rather is and should be a detection. 2) Metaphor of the mirror is an adequate metaphor for a cognition because it expresses well our intuitions about the criterion of the correct cognition. 3) Subjective contribution in the cognition is not something good and desirable but rather just an error that has to be corrected. 4) We do not see our mental representations of the things, what we see are things themselves. 5) We have to draw a distinction between a process of cognition and the outcome of cognition, that is, a distinction between how we know and what we know. 6) Mind does not synthesize experience in accordance with its own rules, it resynthetizes it in accordance with the physical reality it represents. 7) Cognitive subject is active on the (i) volitional and conscious level, on the (ii) subconscious and automatic level, but is not and it should not be active on the (iii) general metaphysical level.