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Resolving "Too Big to Fail"
被引:4
|作者:
Cetorelli, Nicola
[1
]
Traina, James
[2
]
机构:
[1] Fed Reserve Bank New York, New York, NY 10045 USA
[2] Univ Chicago, Chicago, IL 60637 USA
关键词:
Cost of capital;
Time consistency;
Too big to fail;
Resolution plans;
Dodd-Frank;
IMPLIED COST;
EQUITY;
SECTOR;
RETURN;
D O I:
10.1007/s10693-021-00352-1
中图分类号:
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号:
0202 ;
摘要:
Using a synthetic control research design, we find that living will regulation increases a bank's annual cost of capital by 22 bps, or 10% of total funding costs. This effect is stronger in banks measured as systemically important before the regulation's announcement. We interpret our findings as a reduction in Too-Big-to-Fail subsidies. The effect size is large: multiplying our bank-specific point estimates by funding size implies a subsidy reduction of $42B annually. The impact on equity drives the main effect. The impact on deposits is statistically indistinguishable from zero, passing the placebo test for our empirical strategy.
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页码:1 / 23
页数:23
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