Bureaucratic Politics Arising From, Not Defined by, a Principal-Agency Dyad

被引:6
|
作者
Brehm, John [1 ]
Gates, Scott [2 ,3 ]
机构
[1] Univ Chicago, Chicago, IL 60637 USA
[2] Norwegian Univ Sci & Technol, Oslo, Norway
[3] Peace Res Inst Oslo, Oslo, Norway
关键词
PUBLIC-SERVICE MOTIVATION; METHODOLOGICAL INDIVIDUALISM; PERFORMANCE; INFORMATION; POLICY;
D O I
10.1093/jopart/muu045
中图分类号
D0 [政治学、政治理论];
学科分类号
0302 ; 030201 ;
摘要
We contrast two archetypal modes of research in principal-agency theory and in public administration: an aggregated mode which regards the agency as a unified whole, and a disaggregated mode attending to individuals. We argue for the virtues of the latter approach in that mechanisms are clear, verifiable, and specific. The aggregated approach may also be clear, at the cost of submerging internal conflicts while yielding powerful understandings of the cumulative performance of the agency. The challenge to those of us who advocate the individual, behavioral approach is to identify how to accumulate dyadic performance into larger structures of agency itself.
引用
收藏
页码:27 / 42
页数:16
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