The evolution of cooperation on geographical networks

We study evolutionary public goods game on geographical networks, i.e., complex networks which are located on a geographical plane. The geographical feature effects in two ways: In one way, the geographically-induced network structure influences the overall evolutionary dynamics, and, in the other way, the geographical length of an edge influences the cost when the two players at the two ends interact. For the latter effect, we design a new cost function of cooperators, which simply assumes that the longer the distance between two players, the higher cost the cooperator(s) of them have to pay. In this study, network substrates are generated by a previous spatial network model with a cost-benefit parameter controlling the network topology. Our simulations show that the greatest promotion of cooperation is achieved in the intermediate regime of the parameter, in which empirical estimates of various railway networks fall. Further, we investigate how the distribution of edges' geographical costs influences the evolutionary dynamics and consider three patterns of the distribution: an approximately-equal distribution, a diverse distribution, and a polarized distribution. For normal geographical networks which are generated using intermediate values of the cost-benefit parameter, a diverse distribution hinders the evolution of cooperation, whereas a polarized distribution lowers the threshold value of the amplification factor for cooperation in public goods game. These results are helpful for understanding the evolution of cooperation on real-world geographical networks. (C) 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.