Welfare-maximizing and revenue-maximizing tariffs with a few domestic firms

被引：24

作者：

Larue, B ^{[1
]}

Gervais, JP ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Laval, Dept Econ Agroalimentaire & Sci Consommat, Quebec City, PQ G1K 7P4, Canada

来源：

CANADIAN JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS-REVUE CANADIENNE D ECONOMIQUE | 2002年 / 35卷 / 04期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1111/1540-5982.00154

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

In this paper we compare the orthodox optimal tariff formula with the appropriate welfare-maximizing tariff when there are a few producing or importing firms. The welfare-maximizing tariff can be very low, voire negative in some cases, while in others it can even exceed the maximum-revenue tariff. The relationship between the welfare-maximizing tariff and the number of firms need not be monotonically increasing, because the tariff is not strictly used to internalize terms of trade externality. It is also used to manipulate cost asymmetries between producing and importing firms. Welfare-maximizing specific tariffs are never worse than their ad valorem counterparts.

引用

页码：786 / 804

页数：19

共 23 条

[1]

[Anonymous], RELATIVE INEFFICIENC

[2]

[Anonymous], HDB INT EC

[3] 2 REMARKS ON COURNOT EQUILIBRIA [J].

BERGSTROM, TC ;

VARIAN, HR .

ECONOMICS LETTERS, 1985, 19 (01) :5-8

[4]

Brander J.A., 1995, HDB INT EC

[5]

CHOI EK, 1991, J DEV ECON, V35, P243

[6] Strategic managerial delegation and trade policy [J].

Das, SP .

JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS, 1997, 43 (1-2) :173-188

[7]

Graff J. de V., 1949, REV ECON STUD, V17, P47

[8] A NOTE ON THE OPTIMAL TARIFF, RETALIATION AND THE WELFARE LOSS FROM TARIFF WARS IN A FRAMEWORK WITH INTRAINDUSTRY TRADE [J].

GROS, D .

JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS, 1987, 23 (3-4) :357-367

[9] Optimum Tariffs and Retaliation [J].

Johnson, Harry G. .

REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES, 1953, 21 :142-153

[10] Optimum Welfare and Maximum Revenue Tariffs [J].

Johnson, Harry G. .

REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES, 1951, 19 :28-35

← 1 2 3 →