Financial market pressure, tacit collusion and oil price formation

被引:17
|
作者
Aune, Finn Roar [2 ]
Mohn, Klaus [1 ]
Osmundsen, Petter [1 ]
Rosendahl, Knut Einar [2 ]
机构
[1] Univ Stavanger, N-4036 Stavanger, Norway
[2] Stat Norway, N-0033 Oslo, Norway
关键词
Investment behaviour; Market power; Oil market; Tacit collusion; CARTEL; OPEC; MACROECONOMY; EXPLORATION; ECONOMICS; OLIGOPOLY;
D O I
10.1016/j.eneco.2009.09.003
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We explore a hypothesis that a change in investment behaviour among international oil companies (IOC) towards the end of the 1990s had long-lived effects on OPEC strategies, and on oil price formation. Coordinated investment constraints were imposed on the IOCs through financial market pressures for improved short-term profitability in the wake of the Asian economic crisis. A partial equilibrium model for the global oil market is applied to compare the effects of these tacitly collusive capital constraints on oil supply with an alternative characterised by industrial stability. Our results suggest that even temporary economic and financial shocks may have a long-term impact on oil price formation. (C) 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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页码:389 / 398
页数:10
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