Moral hazard in investment and endogenous risk taking

被引:0
|
作者
Li, Rui [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Massachusetts, Dept Accounting & Finance, Coll Management, 100 Morrissey Blvd, Boston, MA 02125 USA
关键词
Dynamic contract; Endogenous risk taking; Moral hazard;
D O I
10.1016/j.econlet.2017.05.018
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
study a dynamic moral hazard model with endogenous risk taking, in which exposing the firm to greater risks could align the manager's private benefit with that of the owner and thus enhance the incentive provision. Published by Elsevier B.V.
引用
收藏
页码:112 / 115
页数:4
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