Optimal inside debt compensation and the value of equity and debt

被引:33
|
作者
Campbell, T. Colin [1 ]
Galpin, Neal [2 ]
Johnson, Shane A. [3 ]
机构
[1] Miami Univ, 800 E High St,2053 FSB, Oxford, OH 45056 USA
[2] Univ Melbourne, Dept Finance, 198 Berkeley St, Melbourne, Vic 3010, Australia
[3] Texas A&M Univ, 4218 TAMU, College Stn, TX 77843 USA
关键词
Inside debt; Pensions; Executive compensation; Incentives; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; CEO; AGENCY; FIRM;
D O I
10.1016/j.jfineco.2015.09.003
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
We use firm and chief executive officer (CEO) characteristics motivated by optimal contracting theory to estimate optimal CEO relative debt-equity incentive ratios. Equity values rise as firms adjust CEO incentive ratios toward their predicted optimums, whether that increases or decreases the relative incentive ratio. Debt values rise as firms adjust ratios upward and do not fall as they adjust them downward. Our predicted optimums explain changes in equity and debt values better than a model in which firms simply match CEO inside debt-equity ratios to firm debt-equity ratios. The results suggest important cross-sectional differences in firms' optimal inside debt policies. (C) 2015 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:336 / 352
页数:17
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