Cooperative Spectrum Sensing Schemes for Cognitive Radios Using Dynamic Spectrum Auctions

In this paper, we tackle the spectrum allocation problem in cognitive radio networks with the combined solution using the cooperative spectrum sensing a and adaptive spectrum auction process. Different from all the previous work analyzing the traditional spectrum auction mechanisms, we introduce the spectrum sensing impairments resulting to the existence of the risk entering the spectrum auction process. The term risk reflects the situation when the fusion center based on the information from the secondary terminals participating on the cooperative spectrum access gives the permission to the terminals to transmit, but in fact there is still primary user active. This results in the collisions due to the false information entering the spectrum auction process. Due to the stochastic nature of the risk, the different decision logics of the distributed spectrum sensing algorithms provides different results. We analyze and, or and majority decision rules of the distributed spectrum access jointly with the sensitivity of the multiple unit sequential first-price sealed-bid auction spectrum auction against the false detection. The results demonstrate that in risky environment, total revenue and total payoff of the auctioneer and bidder respectively is lower, than in the case of system with lower level of risk.