Evidence on performance pay and risk aversion

被引：41
|
作者：
Grund, Christian [2 ]
Sliwka, Dirk [1 ]
机构：
[1] Univ Cologne, D-50931 Cologne, Germany
[2] Univ Wurzburg, D-97070 Wurzburg, Germany
来源：
ECONOMICS LETTERS | 2010年 / 106卷 / 01期
关键词：
Agency theory; Incentives; Pay for performance; Risk; Risk aversion; MORAL HAZARD; INCENTIVES; FIRMS;
D O I：
10.1016/j.econlet.2009.09.005
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
Making use of a unique representative data set, we find clear evidence that risk aversion has a highly significant and substantial negative impact on the probability that an employee's pay is performance contingent, which confirms the well known risk-incentive trade-off. (C) 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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页码：8 / 11
页数：4
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