Vertical structure and patent pools

被引:48
作者
Kim, SH [1 ]
机构
[1] Johns Hopkins Univ, Dept Econ, Baltimore, MD 21218 USA
关键词
double marginalization; licensing; patent pool; raising rivals' costs; vertical integration;
D O I
10.1007/s11151-004-3535-z
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
It is well known that patent pools can enhance efficiency by eliminating the complements problem. This paper investigates how the presence of vertically integrated firms affects the economic impact of a patent pool. Without a patent pool, the presence of integrated firms may either increase or decrease the final product price as there are two countervailing effects - reduced double marginalization and raising rivals' costs. However, when there is a patent pool, vertical integration always lowers the final product price. In conclusion, the economic efficiency arguments for patent pools are enhanced when some firms are vertically integrated.
引用
收藏
页码:231 / 250
页数:20
相关论文
共 13 条
[1]  
[Anonymous], EXPANDING BOUNDARIES
[2]   Sequential innovation and the patent-antitrust conflict [J].
Denicolò, V .
OXFORD ECONOMIC PAPERS-NEW SERIES, 2002, 54 (04) :649-668
[3]  
GILBERT R, 2004, IN PRESS STANFORD TE
[4]   Can patents deter innovation? The anticommons in biomedical research [J].
Heller, MA ;
Eisenberg, RS .
SCIENCE, 1998, 280 (5364) :698-701
[5]   Efficient patent pools [J].
Lerner, J ;
Tirole, J .
AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 2004, 94 (03) :691-711
[6]  
Lerner J., 2003, 9680 NBER
[7]  
ORDOVER JA, 1990, AM ECON REV, V80, P127
[8]  
REY P, 2003, HDB IND ORG, V3
[9]  
SALINGER M, 1988, Q J ECON, V77, P345
[10]  
SALOP SC, 1983, AM ECON REV, V73, P267