Determinants of firm's holding female directors: evidence from Australia

被引:1
|
作者
Salma, Ummya [1 ,2 ]
Qian, Aimin [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Int Business & Econ UIBE, Sch Business, Beijing, Peoples R China
[2] Bangladesh Univ Professionals BUP, Dept Business Adm Management Studies, Dhaka, Bangladesh
关键词
Gender diversity; Female directors; Product market competition; Australia; PRODUCT MARKET COMPETITION; CORPORATE BOARDS; MANAGERIAL INCENTIVES; WOMEN; DIVERSITY; AGENCY; DIVERSIFICATION; REPRESENTATION; ASSOCIATION; PERFORMANCE;
D O I
10.1007/s13520-021-00129-8
中图分类号
B82 [伦理学(道德学)];
学科分类号
摘要
This research paper aims to examine the association between product market competition and gender diversity on the corporate board. More specifically, this paper examines the likely corporate governance determinants of firms operating by female directors. This study included all the Australian listed companies in the primary list of samples from 2001 to 2015. This research explored that low competition increases the probability of existing female directors on the corporate board. Results also reveal that low product market competition is positively associated with firms' female directors where female directors are the member of the audit committee and have long service experience. This research obtains evidence that low-competitive firms encourage board gender diversity even if their presence is insignificant (as a token). This study contributes to the literature by providing evidence that first, low competition drives managers to appoint female directors on board as few primarily large firms with low competition show fairness to comply with corporate governance regulations, especially on gender diversity. Moreover, low competition forces firms to search for unique competitive advantage, and gender diversity is one of them which can increase the visibility of female directors. Finally, a firm's board gender diversity can ensure intense monitoring, rational decision, advising, calculative risk-taking comparing with a gender bias board and leading to a good firm image for the stakeholders.
引用
收藏
页码:245 / 273
页数:29
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