The Philosophical Use and Misuse of Science

被引:4
|
作者
Kingsbury, Justine [1 ]
Dare, Tim [2 ]
机构
[1] Univ Waikato, Philosophy Programme, Private Bag 3105, Hamilton 3216, New Zealand
[2] Univ Auckland, Philosophy Programme, Private Bag 92019, Auckland 1142, New Zealand
关键词
cherry-picking; empirical philosophy; interdisciplinarity; philosophical methodology; philosophy; science; misuse of science; FEELING GOOD; HUMANS;
D O I
10.1111/meta.12256
中图分类号
B [哲学、宗教];
学科分类号
01 ; 0101 ;
摘要
Science is our best way of finding out about the natural world, and philosophers who write about that world ought to be sensitive to the claims of our best science. There are obstacles, however, to outsiders using science well. We think philosophers are prone to misuse science: to give undue weight to results that are untested; to highlight favorable and ignore unfavorable data; to give illegitimate weight to the authority of science; to leap from scientific premises to philosophical conclusions without spelling out their relevance; to treat mere resonance between a scientific theory and a philosophical view as empirical evidence for the philosophical view. This article identifies and illustrates some of the ways in which philosophers misuse science, explains why these pitfalls are easy to fall into, and concludes with suggestions for avoiding them.
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页码:449 / 466
页数:18
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