Orthodox, revisionist and post-revisionist historiography on the American intervention in the Vietnam War

In Vietnam War historiography three phases should be distinguished: the orthodox, the revisionist and the postrevisionist, each with different visions and accents. In the postrevisionist phase the neo-orthodox vision of a flawed containment as the main cause of the war is clearly dominant while some points of discussion are still visible. The author concludes that historians are increasingly situating the American escalation of the sixties in the continuity of the period since 1945. In this article the author concentrates on recent studies of Philip E. Catton, Howard Jones, John Prados, Robert Dallek, Frederik Logevall, Robert Mann, Lloyd C. Gardner, George C. Herring, H.R. McMaster, Jeffrey Record, Jeffrey P. Kimball, Larry Berman and Pierre Asselin. the highlights of that historiography are analysed: the thesis of the 'withdrawal-without-victory' concerning J.F. Kennedy (which should be criticized), the contingent and more structural facets of Johnson's escalation (the former gaining more attention at the moment), the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, the Tet Offensive, the question 'Why America lost Vietnam' (the author supports Record's vision that this wrong war was unwinnable), and some elements of Nixon's Vietnam War policy (which is rightly criticized).