Individual differences in belief inhibition during syllogistic reasoning

被引:0
|
作者
Srol, Jakub [1 ]
机构
[1] Ustav Expt Psychol SAV, Bratislava, Slovakia
来源
CESKOSLOVENSKA PSYCHOLOGIE | 2018年 / 62卷 / 01期
关键词
belief inhibition; syllogistic reasoning; individual differences; executive functions; COGNITIVE REFLECTION; EXECUTIVE FUNCTIONS; THINKING; HEURISTICS; CONFLICT; BIASES; PERFORMANCE; PREDICTOR; VALIDITY; ABILITY;
D O I
暂无
中图分类号
B84 [心理学];
学科分类号
04 ; 0402 ;
摘要
Objectives. The aim of present study was to determine, whether executive inhibition and cognitive flexibility contribute to resisting belief bias in reasoning. It was also of interest to find out, whether all people inhibit their beliefs, or only cognitively less disposed participants depend on this process while solving syllogisms. Sample and setting. Study sample consisted of 72 students, who were asked to solve 8 conflict and no-conflict syllogisms. To measure signs of belief inhibition participants were presented with lexical decision tasks after answering each syllogism. Parametric go/no-go task was used to assess participant, s executive skills. Hypotheses. It was assumed that participants with higher executive skills will be more effective in solving conflict syllogisms. The main hypothesis was that in contrast with the rest of the sample, participants with most pronounced executive skills will not exhibit signs of belief inhibition after answering conflict tasks. Statistical analysis. Correlation analysis was used to test the role of executive functions in resisting belief bias. To examine the hypothesis that signs of belief inhibition will only be present among participants with below-average executive skills, mixed ANOVA was employed, along with Bayes factor computation. Results. Concerning relationship between executive functions and the ability to solve conflict syllogisms, correlation was found only in the case of cognitive flexibility. The results also showed that signs of belief inhibition were present in executively most gifted participants, as well as in the rest of the sample. Study limitations. Study sample was not a representative sample of general population. One complex executive task was used instead of SEM approach to measure executive functioning.
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页码:1 / 15
页数:15
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