Open outcry auctions with secret reserve prices:: an empirical application to executive auctions of tenant owner's apartments in Sweden

被引：12

作者：

Eklöf, M

Lunander, A ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Orebro, Dept Econ, SE-70182 Orebro, Sweden

[2] Uppsala Univ, Dept Econ, SE-75120 Uppsala, Sweden

来源：

JOURNAL OF ECONOMETRICS | 2003年 / 114卷 / 02期

关键词：

English auction; reserve price; structural estimation;

D O I：

10.1016/S0304-4076(03)00084-8

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

This paper considers an open outcry auction with a secret reserve price within the independent private-values paradigm. The theoretical model is mapped into an econometric specification and the distribution of private values is estimated. The objective is to quantify the seller's expected profit from moving to a mechanism where the reserve price is announced. Simulations indicate that the seller's revenue is about 10% higher if a reserve price is announced. (C) 2003 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：243 / 260

页数：18