A Marginal Analysis of the Residual Rights in Firm

被引:0
|
作者
Yuan Shi-Chen [1 ]
机构
[1] Wuhan Univ, Sch Econ & Management, Wuhan 430072, Hubei, Peoples R China
关键词
Marginal Analysis; Residual Control of Rights; Residual Claim; Ownership Rights;
D O I
暂无
中图分类号
C93 [管理学];
学科分类号
12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;
摘要
The allocation of residual rights in firm is an important question in the theory of firm, and also is the most proportion of incentive theory. With a marginal analysis in a two-people model, this article analyses the allocation of residual rights in a firm. The result is: residual claim rights and the surplus control rights of corporation are dispersed with a symmetrical distribution, and tend to concentrate as the concentration of certain elements to the owners of factor inputs.
引用
收藏
页码:800 / 803
页数:4
相关论文
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