(Moral) agent of the ethics of social consequences: A philosophical-psychological analysis

Ethics of social consequences is conceived mostly as a theory of right action. It does, however, operate on two scales of morality: besides the theory of right action, which is judgment-oriented and concerns itself with formal and objective aspects of action, the theory also deals with the level of moral motivation, i.e., the subjective scope of the action's moral content. These scales of morality, both taken into account, may be comprehended as expressions of fundamental subject-object forms of orientation and relativity in context of moral judgment and reflection objective and subjective orientation, or extroverted and introverted attitude. Presented paper analyses the concept of the subject of morality in the ethics of social consequences through the optics of C. G. Jung's fundamental psychological forms of orientation. Its aim is to explore the anthropological basis of this ethical theory in an original and productive way. Through this optic, ethics of social consequences one-sidedly prefers the objectively oriented way of moral judging. Paper's conclusions thus particularly imply the need for a more coherent emphasizing of the theory's subjectively oriented aspect's significance and purpose.