In a Small Moment: Class Size and Moral Hazard in the Italian Mezzogiorno

被引:36
|
作者
Angrist, Joshua D. [1 ,2 ,3 ]
Battistin, Erich [2 ,4 ,5 ]
Vuri, Daniela [2 ,6 ,7 ]
机构
[1] MIT, Dept Econ, 50 Mem Dr, Cambridge, MA 02142 USA
[2] IZA, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
[3] NBER, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
[4] Queen Mary Univ London, Sch Econ & Finance, Mile End Rd, London E1 4NS, England
[5] CEPR, FBK IRVAPP, London, England
[6] Univ Roma Tor Vergata, Dept Econ & Finance, Via Columbia 2, I-00133 Rome, Italy
[7] CEIS, CESIFo, Rome, Italy
关键词
STUDENT-ACHIEVEMENT; SCHOLASTIC ACHIEVEMENT; DEVELOPING-COUNTRIES; OUTCOMES EVIDENCE; MISCLASSIFICATION; SCHOOLS; TEACHER; ABSENCE; NORWAY; MODELS;
D O I
10.1257/app.20160267
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Instrumental variables (IV) estimates show strong class-size effects in Southern Italy. But Italy's Mezzogiorno is distinguished by manipulation of standardized test scores as well as by economic disadvantage. IV estimates suggest small classes increase manipulation. We argue that score manipulation is a consequence of teacher shirking. IV estimates of a causal model for achievement as a function of class size and score manipulation show that class-size effects on measured achievement are driven entirely by the relationship between class size and manipulation. These results illustrate how consequential score manipulation can arise even in assessment systems with few accountability concerns.
引用
收藏
页码:216 / 249
页数:34
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