More Information, More Ripoffs: Experiments with Public and Private Information in Markets with Asymmetric Information

被引:2
|
作者
Wilson, Bart J. [2 ]
Zillante, Arthur [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ N Carolina, Dept Econ, Charlotte, NC 28223 USA
[2] Chapman Univ, Econ Sci Inst, Orange, CA 92866 USA
关键词
Asymmetric information; Laboratory experiment; Lemons market; Posted-offer; Two-sided multilateral negotiations; ADVERSE SELECTION; PRODUCT QUALITY; LEMONS; AUCTIONS;
D O I
10.1007/s11151-010-9240-1
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
It is well known that asymmetric information can be a catalyst for producing a lemons market. What is much less well known is how different institutional arrangements and their concomitant information conditions affect the lemons outcome. We conduct a laboratory experiment to examine the role that two different types of markets-two-sided multilateral negotiations and posted offers-play in an environment with sufficient conditions to yield a lemons outcome. We also investigate the effect that publicly available prices and advertisements have on buyers and sellers in a posted-offer market.
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页码:1 / 16
页数:16
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