Does the introduction of CSR criteria into CEO incentive pay reduce their earnings management? The case of companies listed in the SBF 120

被引：11

作者：

Khenissi, Mohamed ^{[1
]}

Jahmane, Abderrahman ^{[2
]}

Hofaidhllaoui, Mahrane ^{[3
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Grenoble Alpes, CERAG, Grenoble INP, F-38000 Grenoble, France

[2] IPAG Business Sch, Dept Strategy & Management, IPAG Chair Inclus Co, Paris, France

[3] ESSCA Sch Management, Management & Business Environm Dept, HDR, 4 Pont Pasteur, F-69007 Lyon, France

来源：

FINANCE RESEARCH LETTERS | 2022年 / 48卷

关键词：

CEO incentive pay; CSR criteria; Discretionary accruals; Real earnings management; EXECUTIVE-COMPENSATION; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE; OWNERSHIP; DETERMINANTS; DISCLOSURE; QUALITY; FIRM;

D O I：

10.1016/j.frl.2022.102880

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

This study examines the effect of introducing CSR criteria into CEO incentive pay on earnings management practices in French firms listed on the SBF 120 index. Based on panel data for 106 companies over a five-year period between 2014 and 2019, the empirical analysis shows that the inclusion of CSR criteria in compensation contracts reduces the extent of earnings management (as measured by discretionary accruals and real earnings management).

引用

页数：8