DEVIANT VERSUS ASPIRATIONAL RISK TAKING: THE EFFECTS OF PERFORMANCE FEEDBACK ON BRIBERY EXPENDITURE AND R&D INTENSITY

被引:379
作者
Xu, Dean [1 ]
Zhou, Kevin Zheng [2 ]
Du, Fei [3 ]
机构
[1] Monash Univ, Monash Business Sch, Melbourne, Vic, Australia
[2] Univ Hong Kong, Chair Strategy & Int Business, Fac Business & Econ, Hong Kong, Peoples R China
[3] Univ Illinois, Accountancy, Urbana, IL USA
关键词
BEHAVIORAL-THEORY; ORGANIZATIONAL-STRUCTURE; DEVELOPMENT INVESTMENT; FIRMS; CORRUPTION; FOREIGN; SEARCH; CHINA; MARKET; IMPACT;
D O I
10.5465/amj.2016.0749
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Combining the theses of "problemistic search" and "slack search," past research in the behavioral theory of the firm suggests that both low- and high-performing firms may engage in the same type of risk-taking activity. We counter this view with a consistent, motivation-based logic in the theory: low-performing firms are fixated on finding short-term solutions to immediate problems, so they have an increased probability of exhibiting deviant risk-taking behavior such as bribery, whereas high-performing firms are concerned about sustaining their competitive advantage in the long run and will more likely engage in aspirational risk taking such as research and development (R&D). Using a sample of 9,633 firm-year observations covering 2,224 listed companies in China, we find that, as a firm's performance falls further below its aspiration level, it has larger abnormal entertainment spending, an implicit measure of bribery expenditure, but not higher R&D intensity. However, as a firm's performance rises further above its aspiration level, it has greater R&D intensity, but not more bribery expenses. Legal development and industry competition moderate the relationship between performance feedback and risk-taking behavior.
引用
收藏
页码:1226 / 1251
页数:26
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