The effect of managerial horizon on cash holdings

被引:2
|
作者
Guha, Sanjib [1 ]
Rahim, Niazur [1 ]
机构
[1] Christopher Newport Univ, Litter Sch Business, Newport News, VA 23606 USA
关键词
Cash holding; Managerial horizon; RESEARCH-AND-DEVELOPMENT; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; EXECUTIVE-COMPENSATION; AGENCY COSTS; FIRMS HOLD; CEO; MULTINATIONALS; INFORMATION; INVESTMENT; DISCRETION;
D O I
10.1108/MF-09-2018-0442
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
Purpose US corporations are now sitting on an enormous stockpile of cash. Instead of investing their resources and creating jobs, the firms are holding on to excess cash. Academicians and practitioners alike have tried to fathom the reasons why companies are holding on to so much cash. Numerous studies have talked about the various motives for holding cash. Many researchers have tried to correlate excess cash holding with particular firm characteristics. The purpose of this paper is to study the correlations that exist between excess cash holding and some measurable managerial characteristics. Design/methodology/approach Four different measures of managerial horizon (MH) were constructed. The first two constructs (MH1 and MH2) are based on the CEO's age and how long he has been the CEO of the company. The next two constructs (MH3 and MH4) are based on compensation, proportion of current compensation and proportion of future compensation. This paper tries to examine if MH has any impact on excess cash holding. Findings The results clearly show that the CEO age and the proportion of CEO's compensation (current and future) do determine level of cash holding in the company. Younger CEOs hold more cash compared to older CEOs. Older CEOs hold less cash suggesting that as CEOs grow older they might be motivated by the idea of leaving a long lasting legacy. CEOs who receive more of their compensation in future payments also hold on to more cash, whereas CEOs who receive more of their compensation in current payments hold less cash. Originality/value There is no previous literature dealing with MH and cash holding by corporations.
引用
收藏
页码:1092 / 1110
页数:19
相关论文
共 50 条
  • [1] Managerial optimism and corporate cash holdings
    Ly Thi Hai Tran
    Thoa Thi Kim Tu
    Thao Thi Phuong Hoang
    INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF MANAGERIAL FINANCE, 2021, 17 (02) : 214 - 236
  • [2] Subordinate executives' horizon and cash holdings
    Khoo, Joye
    Cheung, Adrian
    INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF ECONOMICS & FINANCE, 2024, 96
  • [3] Cash Holdings Adjustment Speed and Managerial Ability
    Cho, Hyungjin
    Choi, Sera
    Kim, Mi-Ok
    ASIA-PACIFIC JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL STUDIES, 2018, 47 (05) : 695 - 719
  • [4] The Impact of Ambiguity on Managerial Investment and Cash Holdings
    Neamtiu, Monica
    Shroff, Nemit
    White, Hal D.
    Williams, Christopher D.
    JOURNAL OF BUSINESS FINANCE & ACCOUNTING, 2014, 41 (7-8) : 1071 - 1099
  • [5] Effectiveness of monitoring, managerial entrenchment, and corporate cash holdings
    Couzoff, Panagiotis
    Banerjee, Shantanu
    Pawlina, Grzegorz
    JOURNAL OF CORPORATE FINANCE, 2022, 77
  • [6] Firm value, corporate cash holdings and the role of managerial ability
    Chireka, Trust
    Moloi, Tankiso
    SOUTH AFRICAN JOURNAL OF BUSINESS MANAGEMENT, 2024, 55 (01)
  • [7] International evidence on cash holdings and expected managerial agency problems
    Kalcheva, Ivalina
    Lins, Karl V.
    REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES, 2007, 20 (04): : 1087 - 1112
  • [8] CONVEXITY, MAGNIFICATION, AND TRANSLATION: THE EFFECT OF MANAGERIAL OPTION-BASED COMPENSATION ON CORPORATE CASH HOLDINGS
    Belghitar, Yacine
    Clark, Ephraim
    JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL RESEARCH, 2014, 37 (02) : 191 - 210
  • [9] Impacts of Managerial Overconfidence and Agency Costs on Cash Holdings within Blockchain Firms
    Niu, Teng
    Zhao, Xi
    IEEE Access, 2021, 9 : 141453 - 141466
  • [10] Managerial overconfidence and corporate cash holdings: Evidence from primary and secondary data
    Dao, Nhung Thi Tuyet
    Guney, Yilmaz
    Hudson, Robert
    RESEARCH IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS AND FINANCE, 2023, 65