Internalism, externalism, and self-knowledge (Epistemic justification)

Traditionally the discussion concerning the correct analysis of the concept of epistemic justification has centered around the distinction between internalism and externalism. This distinction presupposes that there is a unique kind of epistemic access we have to our own mental states which is characteristic of those states; an 'internal' access, Cartesian in inspiration, according to which physical objects and occurrences, as well as mathematical and logical truths are 'external', while mental occurrences and states are 'internal'. Here I argue that there is not a general and adequate notion of epistemological access applicable to our own mental states and that is suitably 'internal' in the aforementioned sense. A consequence of this, as we shall see, is that the internal/external distinction cannot be done in the traditional manner--something which undermines its usefulness to epistemology.