The strategy-proofness landscape of merging

被引:35
|
作者
Everaere, Patricia [1 ]
Konieczny, Sebastien [1 ]
Marquis, Pierre [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Artois, Fac Sci, CNRS, CRIL, F-62300 Lens, France
来源
JOURNAL OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH | 2007年 / 28卷 / 49-105期
关键词
38;
D O I
10.1613/jair.2034
中图分类号
TP18 [人工智能理论];
学科分类号
081104 ; 0812 ; 0835 ; 1405 ;
摘要
Merging operators aim at defining the beliefs/goals of a group of agents from the beliefs/goals of each member of the group. Whenever an agent of the group has preferences over the possible results of the merging process (i.e., the possible merged bases), she can try to rig the merging process by lying on her true beliefs/goals if this leads to a better merged base according to her point of view. Obviously, strategy-proof operators are highly desirable in order to guarantee equity among agents even when some of them are not sincere. In this paper, we draw the strategy-proof landscape for many merging operators from the literature, including model-based ones and formula-based ones. Both the general case and several restrictions on the merging process are considered.
引用
收藏
页码:49 / 105
页数:57
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