Corporate social responsibility;
Insider trading;
INFORMATION ASYMMETRY;
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE;
NONFINANCIAL DISCLOSURE;
RESPONSIBILITY;
REPUTATION;
PERFORMANCE;
MANAGERS;
COMPENSATION;
INCENTIVES;
CULTURE;
D O I:
10.1016/j.jacceco.2014.03.001
中图分类号:
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号:
0202 ;
摘要:
A firm's investment in corporate social responsibility (CSR) builds a positive image of caring for social good and imposes additional costs on executives' informed trading, which is widely perceived self-serving. We thus expect executives of CSR-conscious firms to be more likely to refrain from informed trading. We find that executives of CSR-conscious firms profit significantly less from insider trades and are less likely to trade prior to future news than executives of non-CSR-conscious firms. The negative association between CSR and insider trading profits is more pronounced when executives' personal interests are more aligned with the interests of the firm. (C) 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.