A dynamic theory of holdup

被引:46
作者
Che, YK [1 ]
Sákovics, J
机构
[1] Univ Wisconsin, Dept Econ, Madison, WI 53706 USA
[2] Univ Edinburgh, Edinburgh Sch Econ, Edinburgh EH8 9JY, Midlothian, Scotland
关键词
investment; bargaining; endogenous pie; contribution games;
D O I
10.1111/j.1468-0262.2004.00526.x
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
The holdup problem arises when parties negotiate to divide the surplus generated by their relationship specific investments. We study this problem in a dynamic model of bargaining and investment which, unlike the stylized static model, allows the parties to continue to invest until they agree on the terms of trade. The investment dynamics overturns the conventional wisdom dramatically. First, the holdup problem need not entail underinvestment when the parties are sufficiently patient. Second, inefficiencies can arise unambiguously in some cases, but they are not caused by the sharing of surplus per se but rather by a failure of an individual rationality constraint.
引用
收藏
页码:1063 / 1103
页数:41
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