Playing Cournot although they shouldn't - Endogenous timing in experimental duopolies with asymmetric cost

被引：22

作者：

Fonseca, MA

Huck, S

Normann, HT ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Royal Holloway Univ London, Dept Econ, Egham TW20 0EX, Surrey, England

[2] UCL, Dept Econ, London WC1E 6BT, England

[3] UCL, ELSE, London WC1E 6BT, England

来源：

ECONOMIC THEORY | 2005年 / 25卷 / 03期

关键词：

commitment; endogenous timing; experimental economics; risk dominance; Stackelberg;

D O I：

10.1007/s00199-003-0456-2

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

In this note, we experimentally investigate the extended game with action commitment in a Cournot duopoly with asymmetric cost. Risk dominance considerations allow to select a unique equilibrium in which the low-cost firm is the Stackelberg leader. The data, however, do not support the theory as simultaneous-move play is modal. Average output choices are in line with the Cournot equilibrium. This suggests that Cournot is a much more robust predictor for competition in markets than theory suggests.

引用

页码：669 / 677

页数：9