Representing, Running, and Revising Mental Models: AComputational Model

被引:11
作者
Friedman, Scott [1 ,2 ]
Forbus, Kenneth [2 ]
Sherin, Bruce [3 ]
机构
[1] SIFT, 319 1st Ave N,Suite 400, Minneapolis, MN 55401 USA
[2] Northwestern Univ, Qualitat Reasoning Grp, Evanston, IL 60208 USA
[3] Northwestern Univ, Sch Educ & Social Policy, Evanston, IL 60208 USA
关键词
Artificial Intelligence; Cognitive modeling; Conceptual change; Explanation; Qualitative reasoning; Commonsense science; Belief revision; CONCEPTUAL CHANGE; ANOMALOUS DATA; COHERENCE; EXPLANATIONS; SYSTEMS;
D O I
10.1111/cogs.12574
中图分类号
B84 [心理学];
学科分类号
04 ; 0402 ;
摘要
People use commonsense science knowledge to flexibly explain, predict, and manipulate the world around them, yet we lack computational models of how this commonsense science knowledge is represented, acquired, utilized, and revised. This is an important challenge for cognitive science: Building higher order computational models in this area will help characterize one of the hallmarks of human reasoning, and it will allow us to build more robust reasoning systems. This paper presents a novel assembled coherence (AC) theory of human conceptual change, whereby people revise beliefs and mental models by constructing and evaluating explanations using fragmentary, globally inconsistent knowledge. We implement AC theory with Timber, a computational model of conceptual change that revises its beliefs and generates human-like explanations in commonsense science. Timber represents domain knowledge using predicate calculus and qualitative model fragments, and uses an abductive model formulation algorithm to construct competing explanations for phenomena. Timber then (a) scores competing explanations with respect to previously accepted beliefs, using a cost function based on simplicity and credibility, (b) identifies a low-cost, preferred explanation and accepts its constituent beliefs, and then (c) greedily alters previous explanation preferences to reduce global cost and thereby revise beliefs. Consistency is a soft constraint in Timber; it is biased to select explanations that share consistent beliefs, assumptions, and causal structure with its other, preferred explanations. In this paper, we use Timber to simulate the belief changes of students during clinical interviews about how the seasons change. We show that Timber produces and revises a sequence of explanations similar to those of the students, which supports the psychological plausibility of AC theory.
引用
收藏
页码:1110 / 1145
页数:36
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