MAKING SENSE OF EXPLANATORY OBJECTIONS TO MORAL REALISM

被引：0

|

作者：

Tropman, Elizabeth ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Colorado State Univ, Ft Collins, CO 80523 USA

来源：

AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY | 2013年 / 50卷 / 01期

关键词：

FACTS;

D O I：

暂无

中图分类号：

B [哲学、宗教];

学科分类号：

01 ; 0101 ;

摘要：

引用

收藏

页码：37 / 49

页数：13

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