Asymmetric finite punishments in repeated games

被引：3
|
作者：
Aramendia, Miguel [1 ]
机构：
[1] Univ Basque Country, Bilbao 48015, Spain
来源：
ECONOMICS LETTERS | 2006年 / 92卷 / 02期
关键词：
infinitely repeated games; asymmetric punishments;
D O I：
10.1016/j.econlet.2006.02.010
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
We define a refinement of the subgame perfect equilibrium. The punishment for a deviation lasts for several periods after which the players revert to cooperative behavior, and during the punishment phase, the nondeviators are better off than the deviator. (c) 2006 Elsevier B.V All rights reserved.
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页码：234 / 239
页数：6
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